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**MESSAGE**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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~~SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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PRIORITY~~

FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE  
TO: JCS WASH DC *MF/Off*  
INFO: CINCNELM LONDON ENGLAND, CINCLANT NORFOLK VA,  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN  
GERMANY, USNMR PARIS FRANCE  
NR: EC 9-6296  
NOFORN  
FOR SEC  
Ref JCS msg nr 932330 dtd 6 Nov 57.  
This msg in 4 parts.  
Part I. Intelligence brief.

161642Z NOV 57  
DECLASSIFIED BY: NOV 57  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

*4 April 1979*

1. Recent harassment of rail, highway and air traffic to West Berlin reemphasizes capability of USSR to interfere with movement of personnel and freight in a divided Germany and highlights the vulnerability of West Berlin. All personnel and freight moving between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin must cross more than 100 miles of Communist-controlled territory. Communists can obstruct or halt, with little or no advance warning, all land traffic to Berlin without fear of Western interference with Communist internal traffic.

2. Soviet policies and actions affecting Berlin over past decade must be viewed against background of USSR's long-range objective - to force withdrawal of Western powers from Berlin. While USSR and East Germany are undoubtedly influenced by this over-all objective, their recent behavior is believed to have been motivated primarily by one or more of the following immediate objectives:

A. To force allied occupying powers increasingly to deal with GDR, thus achieving de facto recognition of that

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THE PENTAGON

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(16 NOV 57)

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Government.

B. To embarrass the US in West Berlin, where US interests are perhaps most vulnerable with a view to emphasizing Soviet's new "position of strength" and Kremlin's ability to harass Western powers without fear of significant reprisal.

C. To encroach on rights of allied occupying powers to extent that they would institute a self-imposed blockade rather than submit to humiliating controls.

3. Throughout past decade, the pattern of Communist activities regarding allied access to Berlin has reflected, almost without exception, Soviet's overall approach to international affairs. Recent harassments, when viewed in this perspective, are considered to be a by-product of current harsher Soviet foreign policy line rather than aspects of a new Soviet policy approach to Berlin problems.

Part II. Most probable course of action and summary.

1. Course of action most likely to be followed by Communists in the immediate future is one of continued, sporadic harassment and restriction of Berlin traffic, short of total blockade. Soviets and East Germans appear to have divided responsibilities for carrying out this action, with the USSR conducting activities against allied occupying powers, and GDR concentrating on West Germans and West Berliners.

A. Soviets may, for example, refuse to clear allied military trains and convoy travel, unless permitted to conduct a physical inspection of interior of railroad cars or vehicles. They might also attempt to restrict air access by refusing to "guarantee flight safety" for some or all allied flights. Recent unilateral efforts by Soviets to introduce regular GDR commercial flights into the south air corridor to Berlin, without prior joint authorization by the four powers, are indicative of the Soviets threat to restrict air access.

B. Soviets may relinquish certain controls to GDR, such as rail and autobahn check points, thus forcing allies to either deal directly with GDR or discontinue travel, i.e.

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creating a partial self-imposed blockade.

C. East Germans may impose more stringent controls on border traffic, such as rigid pass and travel control systems, to discourage travel into West Berlin.

2. Summary - Although end of current series of harassments cannot be predicted, it is not believed that Communists are planning an all-out crisis over Berlin. Much will depend upon reaction of Western powers, especially the US. If allies counter Communist harassment with firm and united action, subsequent incidents will probably continue to be of minor significance. If allies make minor concessions, the Communists would be expected to press for further major advantages. A provocative and unyielding US position, which would deny the Soviets latitude for negotiation, however, could bring on a real crisis.

### Part III. US-Allied capabilities to counter.

1. Local reprisals and harassing actions: US CINCEUR has capability to counter primarily by continuation of protest and negotiation, tripartitely agreed at Embassy level, and delivered to Soviets by allied officials in Berlin.

A. This measure may become more effective by concurrent delivery of formal protest and worldwide dissemination of timely publicity which rightfully places Soviets in an unfavorable position.

2. Security of Berlin garrison: Security of Berlin garrison is insured to the limit of the capability of available forces.

A. Current US combat strength in Berlin consists of 6th Inf Regt and two MP companies with total assigned strength of 3,272.

B. Following plans for employment of these forces are current and rehearsed periodically:

sectors, Berlin.

(1) Tripartite - Defense of allied

(2) Unilateral:

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troop installations without warning.  
or civil disturbance.  
by enemy force.

- (A) US garrison attacked in their
- (B) Threat of military attack
- (C) US sector Berlin attacked

3. Maintain free access to Berlin in case of severe  
severe harassing action US and allied capability to counter more  
regular GDR commercial into the south air corridor to  
aggressive negotiations to the Ambassador level, tripartite  
Ambassadors at Moscow, or ultimately to United Nations,  
synchronized with compatible local public statements and  
news releases.

4. Limited force in the event of actual blockade  
of Berlin:

A. Unilateral: CINCUSAREUR plans for use of  
limited force, in case of a blockade, are considered adequate  
to counter presently foreseeable Soviet and/or East German  
courses of action.

B. Tripartite: CINCUSAREUR submitted a  
tripartite military study, on the feasibility of employing  
Ambassadors, Bonn, 17 December 1956. (Note: CINCUSAREUR  
has not received reply to date).

5. Evacuation of US non-combatants from Berlin:

A. Unilateral: Plans for evacuation of  
non-combatants by air, motor and combination of motor and  
rail are current and rehearsed periodically.

B. Tripartite: Allied plans for air evacuation  
of US non-combatants from Berlin are being formulated by  
CINCUSAFE, in coordination with CINCUSAREUR to incorporate  
views of British, French and US Embassies.

6. Recommendations to facilitate US EUCOM's  
capability to counter Soviet and/or East German's local

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reprisals and harassing actions:

A. Disseminate worldwide through appropriate information media a sympathetic understanding of public opinion on allied and West German access/exodus difficulties imposed by Soviets and/or East Germans harassing tactics.

B. Liaison with State Department to assure appropriate priority is awarded to diplomatic aspects of US CINCEUR's stipulated Berlin tripartite planning responsibilities. (References para 4B, above).

Part IV. Status of military stockpile Berlin.

Class I. 180 days on hand (chill and freeze 30 days; milk, 4 days)

Class II & IV. 150 days on hand.

Class III. 300 days on hand (mogas)

120 days on hand (allied products)

360 days on hand (solid fuels)

Class V. 30 days supply at combat rate.

Current military stockpile considered adequate.

Status of civilian stockpile under control of the City of Berlin.

A. Fuel:

Hard coal 12 months

Coke 12 months

Brown coal briquettes 12 months

firewood 12 months

B. Liquid fuel:

Gasoline 12 months

Diesel oil 12 months

C. Based on the planned daily ration of about 2,350 calories per person, approx 12 months supply of the following items are on hand: Grain, cereals, fat, coffee, substitute, sugar, salt.

D. Approx 6 months supply of the following items are on hand: Milk, dry whole; meat, milk, dry skimmed, dehydrated potatoes.

E. Medical supplies: Approximately 6 months.

ACTION: JCS

INFO: CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

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